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Errors in instructing the jury have become the single most com-
mon ground for appellate reversal in the Anglo-American legal tra-
dition.' It may be asserted that such reversals create no great
* B.S. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst.; J.D., U.C.L.A. Mr. Robinson is cur-
rently an LL.M. candidate at Harvard Law School and a part-time instructor
of Law at Boston University Law School.
A substantial amount of this article was researched and written while
the author was a Faculty Fellow of the National Center for State Courts.
The study was supported by Grant Number 72 DF 99-0035 awarded by
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The
opinions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Center or the U.S. Department of Justice.
The author wishes to acknowledge the significant contributions of Jus-
tice Winslow Christian of the California Court of Appeal, first Director of
the National Center for State Courts, in the preparation of this article.
1. D. KARLEN, ANGLO-AMEnIcAN CRIMINAL JusTIcE 189 (1967). For ex-
ample, 478 F.2d reports sixty-four appeals from criminal jury trials.
Twenty-five of those sixty-four opinions discuss in some way the ade-
quacy of the jury instructions. (When a decision contained no reference
to whether the case had been heard by jury or judge, it was categorized
as a jury trial). Since many decisions discussed only the issues upon
which it was reversing or only the controlling issues (saying simply that
it found all other issues raised by the petitioner to be without merit), the
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cause for concern because they do not necessarily indicate an in-
adequacy of the trial system, but simply reflect the use of jury
instructions as an appellate battleground for opposing legal the-
ories. But one may ask whether such battles might have been
fought more appropriately at trial, without the-need for the unnec-
essary delay and expense of appellate reversal and retrial. At the
very least, the high number of reversals due to errors in jury in-
structions indicate that problems in the jury instruction area de-
serve careful analysis.
Perhaps the most distressing problem with the present instruc-
tion procedure is that while instructions do not provide adequate
means for airing and resolving legal conflicts at trial, neither do
they perform adequately their primary function: to assist the
jurors in understanding the law they are to apply to the case.
2 It
is no secret that ritualistic delivery of a collection of technically
worded instructions may be more confusing than helpful.3
It is suggested here that one reason instructions generally fail
in their function of guiding and enlightening the jury is that trial
judges are driven to a primary concern with avoiding reversal
due to some technical error in formulating instructions. The tech-
nical and abstract language of pattern instructions, so confusing to
laymen jurors,4 results from the scrutiny to which instructions are
frequency with which jury instruction claims were made in the sample
cannot be determined. But what is shown is that the appellate court
felt obligated to discuss the adequacy of the jury instructions in two of
every five appealed criminal cases in which instructions were given.
2. The Commentary to ABA Standard 4.6 relating to jury instructions
begins,
Instructions to jurors should be 'clear, concise, accurate and im-
partial statements of the law written in understandable language
and delivered in a conversational tone which will be of helpful
guidance to the jurors.' [citation].
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIvINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
TRIAL BY JURY 111 (1968).
3. See, e.g., Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HAST. L.J. 456 (1962).
4. See, e.g.,
CAL. Juoy INsTR. CRn=. (CALJIC) 8.52
Murder or Manslaughter-Cooling Period
To reduce a killing upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion
from murder to manslaughter the killing must have occurred while
the slayer was acting under the direct and immediate influence of
such quarrel or heat of passion. Where the influence of the sud-
den quarrel or heat of passion has ceased to obscure the mind of
the accused and sufficient time has elapsed for angry passion to end
and for reason to control his conduct, it will no longer reduce an
intentional killing to manslaughter. The question as to whether
the cooling period has elapsed and reason had returned is not meas-
ured by the standard of the accused, but the duration of the cooling
period is the time it would take the average or ordinarily rea-
sonable person to have cooled his heat of passion and for his rea-
son to have returned.
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subjected on appeal. "[T]he language of decisions and statutes
may represent correct and unimpeachable statements of the law,
but the phraseology may be far removed from the juror's compre-
hension."5
The function of instructions as a means of airing and resolving
legal disputes at trial is, however, an important one. Effective
communication of ideas and guidelines that are legally unsound is
certainly as detrimental to the end of justice as is ineffective com-
munication of legally correct information. The advocates must
each have an opportunity to suggest instructions which represent
their legal theory and to present to the court arguments in support
CALJIC 16.830 (1973 Revised)
Drunk Driving
Any person who, while [under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor,] [or] [under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor
and any drug,] drives a vehicle, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
[The term "drug", as used in this instruction, means any sub-
stance or combination of substances, other than alcohol, which
could so affect the nervous system, brain, or muscles of a person as
to impair, to an appreciable degree, his ability to drive a vehicle
in the manner that an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, in full
possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would drive a
similar vehicle under like conditions.]
CALJIC 1.20
"Wilfully"-Defined
The word "willfully," when applied to the intent with which an
act is done or omitted and as used in my instructions, implies
simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or to make the
omission in question. The word does not require in its meaning








"Malice" may be either express or implied.
[Malice is express when there is manifested an intention unlaw-
fully to kill a human being].
[Malice is implied [when the killing results from an act involv-
a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is
done for a base, anti-social purpose and with a wanton disregard
for human life] [or] [when the killing is a direct causal result of
the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate a felony inherently
dangerous to human life].]
The mental state constituting malice aforethought does not neces-
sarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed."Aforethought" does not imply deliberation or a lapse of consid-
erable time. It only means that the required mental state must
precede rather than follow the act.
5. Parnell, Uniform Jury IMtructions, 32 Wis. B. BuLL. 58 (1959).
of those instructions and that theory." Only then can the court
make a knowledgeable decision as to the proper law on which to
instruct; and only then can an appellate court knowledgeably judge
the quality of the trial court's actions.
This article will present what appears to be a workable system
which allows fulfillment of both of the jury instruction functions
-jury guidance and legal-theory-resolution-and which will si-
multaneously reduce the number of reversals due to judicial error
in instructing the jury (the latter result may be anticipated in any
system which is able to produce the former result).
It is currently standard practice to require a trial judge to deter-
mine which instructions are to be given, not only from those pro-
posed by the advocates, but also from those not proposed; in other
words, he must on his own, sua sponte, give the jury certain in-
structions in certain situations. And more important, any omis-
sion of a pertinent instruction may be cause for reversal on ap-
peal. For an attorney with a weak case, the most effective tactic
may be to withhold participation in the preparation of the jury
instructions, to propose no instructions whatsoever, and instead to
leave the judge to make his own way, determining for himself
which instructions counsel might have proposed on behalf of his
client.
In some cases this absence of assistance may even be replaced
with an active obstruction or misleading of the judge, as may have
occurred in the case of People v. Newton.7 There defense counsel
offered an instruction, later withdrew it, but successfully argued
on appeal that the judge should have given the withdrawn in-
struction sua sponte. Thus, not only is the judge obliged to take
up a role abdicated by counsel, but in some situations he may be
required to improve upon counsel's own voluntary decision.
This article proposes the abolition of the sua sponte duty of the
trial judge except for certain basic instructions to be specified by
statute or by rule of court. The proposal would retain for each
advocate the opportunity to propose instructions reflecting his own
6. ABA Standard 4.6 (c) provides:
At a conference on instructions, which should be held out of the
hearing of the jury, and, on request of any party, out of the presence
of the jury, counsel should be afforded an opportunity to object to
any instruction tendered by another party or prepared at the di-
rection of the court. The court should advise counsel what instruc-
tions will be given prior to their delivery and, in any event, before
the arguments to the jury.
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIM AL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
TRIAL BY JURY 110 (1968).
7. 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970).
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theory of the case, and for the judge the responsibility to select
or compose proper instructions. A judge believing that instruc-
tions beyond those proposed would be appropriate would still give
those additional instructions. It would still be advisable for the
court to confer with counsel before settling the instructions. The
correctness and adequacy of instructions would still be reviewable
on appeal. But the instruction process would cease to be a trap
and would resume its rightful functions of guidance and com-
munication.
EVOLUTION OF THE SUA SPoNTE DUTY: FROm SHIELD TO SWORD
The proposal here is simple, as is the procedure to implement it.
The ability of such a simple reform to provide the needed solution
may be explained by the fact that the evolution of the sua sponte
duty to its present state has been a piecemeal aberration, unjusti-
fiable from any broad perspective of the system.
The practice at common law was for the jury to decide both the
facts and the law of the case. Thus, at the end of the trial,
counsel argued his version of the law of the case, along with
the facts, to the jury. The judge not only had no duty to instruct
Sua sponte, but no duty to instruct at all. In fact he had no au-
thority to instruct.
Although the matter was still a subject of controversy, at the
time of American independence the prevailing rule had become that
the court should judge the law, and the jury should apply that law
to the facts. It had become the general consensus that in the inter-
ests of providing the defendant with an informed jury, the judge
should have general responsibility for insuring that they were
properly instructed as to the law of the case. Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, for example, describes the 18th Century procedure, as
follows:
When the evidence is gone through on both sides, the judge in
the presence of the parties, the counsel, and all others, sums up
the whole to the jury; omitting all superfluous circumstances, ob-
serving wherein the main question and principal issue lies, stating
what evidence has been given to support it, with such remarks
as he thinks necessary for their direction, and giving them his opin-
ion in matters of law arising upon that evidence. 8
8. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoinuE ARIES 375 (1803 ed.).
Interestingly, this procedure had been criticized in the American
Colonies because it prevented the jury from disregarding assert-
edly arbitrary and unjust rulings of the judges holding office by
authority of the Crown.9 As a result, many states followed the
contrary rule, allowing juries to decide the law. Only Maryland
still adheres to this position.'0 Although many other states have
such a rule provided in their state constitutions, all simply ignore
it."1
Under the general rule-the jury responsible only for determina-
tion of the facts-it could be assumed that there would often exist
differences of opinion between opposing counsel and between court
and counsel as to what instructions concerning the law should be
given to the jury. The situation presents a fairly typical set of
circumstances in which the problem is normally resolved, under
the Anglo-American tradition, by the use of the adversary system.
In the case of jury instructions, however, the American solution
was something of a half-breed. The judge was given the general
obligation to instruct, but the advocates were required to submit
specific instructions, and, when they believed it necessary, to ob-
ject to instructions proposed. The court's actions in accepting and
rejecting counsel's proposed instructions were made reviewable on
appeal.
The next step in the evolution was to require in the interest of
justice that the court, even without request, instruct the jury as
to the general principles of law necessary for determining the
questions in the case, including, for example, instructions on the
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the definition
of "reasonable doubt" or "preponderance of the evidence." Most
jurisdictions in the United States today acknowledge some such
sua sponte duty of the trial judge.'
2
The last step of the process was to enlarge the sua sponte duty
from an instruction concerning "fundamental principles of law" to
any instruction which touches the legal theory of the case as de-
termined by the appellate court. But before considering this cur-
rent rule in more detail, two observations of the duty's develop-
ment are in order.
9. For a more detailed discussion see Slansky v. State, 63 A.2d 599,
601-604 (1949). See generally S. MiLsom, HISTORxcAL FOUNDATIONS OF COM-
MON LAW 37-8, 64-70 (1969); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISs HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 129-38 (5th ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, ISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 621-32 (2d ed. 1898).
10. See In. CONST. art. XV, § 5.
11. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19; LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 9.
12. See authorities compiled at 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1324, n.48
and notes 16-65, infra.
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First, the evolution was clearly one motivated by "hard cases."
Note, for example, that capital cases were given special considera-
tion in the development, perhaps establishing the duty, or an ex-
pansion of the duty, that was then extended to non-capital cases.'3
Also note that while the sua sponte duty may exist for felony
cases, it may not be required for misdemeanor cases in the same
jurisdiction.14 No doubt the sua sponte expansion sprang from
cases in which such expansion appeared appropriate, perhaps
where inadequate defense counsel may have erroneously failed to
point out the absence of a fundamental instruction. Unfortu-
nately, the multitude of exceptions now available persuade com-
petent defense counsel that the most advantageous strategy is not
to point out the absence of an instruction fundamentally affecting
the defendant's rights. The error of the appellate courts was in
their failure to respond to the "hard cases" with the more appro-
priate theory of inadequate counsel, though such concept may not
have been as well developed at that time as it is now.
Second, although each separate step in the process could have
been justified as "in the interest of justice," the cumulative result,
as will be shown in the next section, is not. "Hard cases" indeed
made "bad law," in this instance. What was initially intended as
a procedure to shield the defendant from an uninformed jury has
become a defendant's sword with which he can foul the judicial
machinery.
CUMMNT STATUS OF THE SUA SPoIr DUTY
The process of development noted above finds some form of sua
sponte duty existing today in most jurisdictions of the United
States.15 In a few states, namely Idaho,16 Kentucky,17 and Ne-
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 273 Pa. 456, 117 A. 192
(1922); State v. West, 138 S.C. 421, 136 S.E. 736 (1927).
14. See, e.g., State v. Pennington, 392 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. App. 1965).
15. The extensive footnotes of this section are meant to provide exam-
ples of the variety of statutory and decisional language which addresses the
sua sponte problem.
16. State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 88 P.2d 493, 496-97 (1939). IDAHO
CODE CRI. P. 19-2132(194) provides in part: "In charging the jury, the
court must state to them all matters of law necessary for their informa-
tion."
17. "In a criminal case it is the duty of the court to give the whole law
of the case, whether asked by the defendant or not." Duroff v. Common-
wealth, 192 Ky. 31, 232 S.W. 47, 50 (1921). "It was incumbent upon the
braska,1 s the sua sponte duty appears to be without limitation.
The court is required to instruct the jury on "the whole law of the
case" or on "all matters of law necessary for their information."
Most jurisdictions however follow a rule of limited sua sponte
duty. The rule may be stated in either a negative or positive form:
"There exists no duty to instruct without request of counsel, ex-
cept . . ." or "the court has a duty to instruct without request of
counsel only when ... ."D The exceptions, or alternatively the
limitations, are defined by such terms as "essential," "controlling,"
"material," or "substantial" principles of law or issues raised; or
alternatively by such phrases as: instructions required to "guard
the rights of the defendant" or to "allow the jury to arrive at a
proper disposition of the case." Jurisdictions in this category in-
clude: Arizona,20 California,21 Colorado, 22 Connecticut, 23 District
court to give correctly to the jury the whole law of the case, and appellant
was not required to offer any instructions or to object to the instructions
given. His rights were fully preserved when in his motion and grounds
for a new trial he raised the point that the instructions did not present the
whole law of the case." Barton v. Commonwealth, 238 Ky. 356, 38 S.W.2d
218, 220 (1931); Skidmore v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 176, 223 S.W.2d 739,
741 (1949).
18. "The law is well established in this state that it is the duty of the
court to instruct the jury upon all the issues of the case presented by the
pleadings and the evidence ... it is the duty of the court to instruct as to
the law applicable, whether the defendant requests such instruction or not."
Foreman v. State, 127 Neb. 824, 257 N.W. 237, 240 (1934); Washington v.
State, 160 Neb. 385, 70 N.W.2d 378, 381-82 (1955).
19. The former form, the negative, is often found in earlier cases of
many jurisdictions which now employ the latter form, the positive. This
illustrates the trend of increasing support for an expanded sua sponte duty.
20. "[I]t is the duty of the court in criminal cases to give instructions on
the general, fundamental principles of the law pertaining to the offense
charged [whether requested to do so or not]." State v. Betts, 71 Ariz. 362,
227 P.2d 749, 754 (1951). But in an earlier case the court held, "In this
jurisdiction the court is under no duty to give instructions that counsel have
not requested. Burgunder v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256." State v.
Hendricks, 66 Ariz. 235, 186 P.2d 943, 950 (1947). (The case cited,
however, does not support the statement made.) But an even earlier de-
cision of the Arizona Supreme Court would seem to suggest that the court
might have the duty to give an instruction which "guards the substantial
rights of the defendant." Leonard v. State, 15 Ariz. 137, 137 P. 412, 415
(1913).
21. See, e.g., People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 531, 83 Cal. Rptr. 166,
169, 463 P.2d 390, 393 (1970):
It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absense of a request,
the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law rele-
vant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Castillo, 70 Cal.
2d 264, 270-271, fn. 5 [74 Cal. Rptr. 385, 449 P.2d 449]; People v.
Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 489-490 [35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677];
People v. Jackson, 59 Cal. 2d 375, 380 [29 Cal. Rptr. 505, 379 P.2d
937]; People v. Putnam, 20 Cal. 2d 885, 890 [129 P.2d 367]; People
v. Warren, 16 Cal. 2d 103, 116-117 [104 P.2d 1024].) The general
principles of law governing the case are those principles closely
and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which
are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. (People v.
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of Columbia,24 Florida,25 Georgia,2 6 Iowa,27 Kansas, 28 Michigan,29
Minnesota,30 Missouri,31 Nevada,32 New Jersey,38 New York,8 4
Wilson, 66 Cal. 2d 749, 759 [59 Cal. Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820]; People
v. Wade, 53 Cal. 2d 322, 334 [1 Cal. Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116]).
For an analysis of how these general rules are applied in particular situa-
tions see notes 69-90 and accompanying text, infra.
22. Mickens v. People, 148 Colo. 237, 365 P.2d 679 (1961).
23. "Indeed, we have repeatedly held that, in the absence of any re-
quest, a court is bound to submit to the jury matters which are necessarily
involved in the disposition of a case or essential to a full and fair consid-
eration of it." State v. Monte, 131 Conn. 134, 38 A.2d 434, 435 (1944).
24. "As to some essential questions of law, it is the duty of the trial
court to instruct the jury, whether requested to do so or not." Kinard v.
United States, 96 F.2d 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1938), citing Kreiner v. United
States, 11 F.2d 722, 731 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 688 (1926).
25. Brunke v. State, 160 Fla. 43, 33 So. 2d 226 (1948).
26. "Upon the trial of a criminal case, the trial judge, in his charge to
the jury, with or without request, should instruct them as to the general
principles of the law which of necessity must be implied by them in
reaching a correct conclusion upon the questions submitted for their con-
sideration. Sledge v. State, 99 Ga. 684, 26 S.E. 756 (1896)." Spivey v.
State, 59 Ga. App. 380, 1 S.E.2d 60, 61 (1939).
27. The court has a duty to instruct sua sponte when it concerns '"ma-
terial questions of law in the case." State v. Perry, 246 Iowa 861, 69
N.W.2d 412, 415 (1955).
28. KANSAS STAT. ANN. 62-1447 (1963) (now KANSAS STAT. ANN. of
1970, ch. 129, § 22-4604) provides in part: "In charging the jury [the judge]
must state to them all matters of law which are necessary for their in-
formation in giving their verdict." The caselaw holds that this requires
the trial court to instruct the jury on all salient features, and that failure
to do so, with or without request, is reversible error. State v. Roth, 200
Kan. 677, 680, 438 P.2d 58, 61 (1968).
29. In Michigan it is reversible error to omit a "legally essential in-
gredient" even though MIcE. ComnILED LAWS, CCP § 768.29 (1968) pro-
vides in part: "The failure of the court to instruct on any point of law
shall not be ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless such
instruction is requested by accused." This conclusion is based on language
in the same section which requires a judge to "instruct the jury as to the
law applicable to the case." People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 69 N.W.2d
140, 143 (1955), citing People v. Tolewitzke, 332 Mich. 455, 52 N.W.2d 184
(1952).
30. The sua sponte duty exists in Minnesota (See, e.g., Robertson v.
Burton, 88 Minn. 151, 92 N.W. 538 [1902]), but is most often delineated
according to what matters are not included in the duty. Specific instruc-
tions as is the case in nearly every U.S. jurisdiction are not required to be
given without request. State v. Rasmussen, 241 Minn. 310, 63 N.W.2d 1, 5
(1954). See 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1325(1), especially note 52. Nei-
ther are cautionary instructions part of the sua sponte duty in Minnesota.
State v. Soltau, 212 Minn. 20, 2 N.W.2d 155, 158 (1942), citing State v.
Jenkins, 171 Minn. 173, 213 N.W. 923 (1927).
31. "It is made the duty of the court to instruct the jury on all questions
North Carolina,35 Ohio,386 Oklahoma, 37 Pennsylvania,38 Rhode Is-
of law arising in the case whether asked or not. State v. Palmer, 88 Mo.
571." State v. Hutchinson, 111 Mo. 257, 264, 20 S.W. 34, 35 (1892). But
this has been construed not to include instructions on "collateral ques-
tions." State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 587, 5 S.W. 257, 270 (1887). State v.
Lackey, 230 Mo. 703, 132 S.W. 602, 606 (1910). ANN. Mo. STAT. § 546.070
(4) (1953) provides in part: "Whether requested or not, the court must
instruct the jury in writing upon all questions of law arising in the case
which are necessary for their information in giving their verdict. .. ."
32. Cases in Nevada impose on counsel the duty to request that a de-
sired instruction be given. "The failure to so request normally waives the
right to complain on appeal, unless the instruction is so necessary to the
case that the court, sua sponte, must be sure that it is given." Mears v.
State, 83 Nev. 3, 422 P.2d 230, 234-35 (1967).
33. "[A] mandatory duty exists on the part of the trial judge to in-
struct the jury as to the fundamental principles of law which control the
case.... And the duty is not affected by the failure of a party to re-
quest that it be discharged." State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530, 550
(1958). Earlier cases, however, required a request to charge. "It is set-
tled law that the failure to charge a proposition of law, even though
applicable to the facts in the case, cannot be made the basis for an assign-
ment of error or of a cause for reversal in the absence of a request to
charge. State v. Capawanna, 118 N.J.L. 429, 193 A. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1937);
State v. Yevchak, 130 N.J.L. 584, 34 A.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1943)." State v.
Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 67 A.2d 175, 180 (1949).
34. People v. Odeil, 230 N.Y. 481, 130 N.E. 619, 622 (1921); People v.
Montesanto, 236 N.Y. 396, 140 N.E. 932 (1923).
35. N.C. GEbr. STAT. 1-180 (1969) provides in part: "[the judge]
shall declare and explain the law arising on the evidence given in the
case." This has been construed to provide a basis for the following con-
clusion: "[T] he authorities are at one in holding that, both in criminal and
civil causes, a judge, in his charge to the jury, should present every sub-
stantial and essential feature of the case embraced within the issue and
arising on the evidence, and this without any special prayer for instruc-
tions to that effect." State v. Merrick, 171 N.C. 788, 795, 88 S.E. 501, 505
(1916) ; State v. Stroupe, 238 N.C. 34, 76 S.E.2d 313, 318 (1953).
36. State v. Sanders, 68 Ohio App. 419, 41 N.E.2d 713, 716-17 (1940).
37. "It is the duty of the court, without request, to instruct the jury
upon all of the essential issues raised by the evidence, but, where no omis-
sion is pointed out, the trial judge need not submit an instruction on every
question of law that might be involved, or touching upon every remote
deduction that might be drawn from the evidence." Roberts v. State,
36 Okla. Crim. 28, 251 P. 612, 614 (1926). "It is the duty of the trial judge
to instruct the jury on the salient features of law raised by the evidence
without a request from defendants. . . ." Hopkins v. State, 28 Okla. Crim.
405, 231 P. 97, 98 (1924). These conclusions are required by OKRA. STAT.
§ 22-856 which states in part: "[I]t is mandatory that the court must in-
form the jury on matters of law which he thinks necessary for their
information in rendering their verdict." Daniel v. State, 67 Okla. Crim.
174, 93 P.2d 47, 49 (1939).
38. "Consequently, when the issue is not clear, it becomes the duty of
the court even though not requested to do so, to give sufficient instruc-
tions to the jury that they may know precisely what propositions are sub-
mitted for their consideration so that they may render a just verdict."
Commonwealth v. Gold, 123 Pa. Super. 128, 130-31, 186 A. 208, 210 (1996);
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 160 Pa. Super. 484, 52 A.2d 230, 232 (1947).
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land,3 9 South Carolina,
40 South Dakota,4 1 Tennessee,
42 Texas,43
Utah,4 4 Vermont,45 Wyoming,
46 and the Federal system.
47
39. In Rhode Island a defendant's failure to request an instruction "does
not relieve a trial court from giving whatever instruction may be made
necessary by the state of the evidence. R.I. GE. LAWS of 1956 (1969
Reenactment) § 8-2-38, requires a trial justice in every civil or criminal
case tried by a jury in the Superior Court to 'instruct the jury in the
law relating to the same * * *' We have held this statute to be man-
datory and to contemplate that juries should be given correct instructions
as to those rules of law that of necessity must be applied to the issues
raised at trial. Macaruso v. Massart, 96 R.I. 168, 190 A.2d 14." State v.
Goff, 267 A.2d 686, 688 (R.I. 1970).
40. Some cases suggest that "[tihe failure to request instructions on
this question can only be regarded as a waiver of the right to such an
acquiescence in the omission. State v. Jamison, 221 S.C. 312, 70 S.E.2d 342."
State v. Fleming, 254 S.C. 415, 175 S.E.2d 624, 628 (1970). However, the
governing rule in South Carolina appears to be that "the burden rests upon
the Trial Judge to charge the law on all material issues, but where the
general charge fairly presents the case to the jury, the party who desires
an instruction on some particular question should request it ...." State
v. Napier, 218 S.C. 320, 62 S.E.2d 793, 794 (1950).
41. Apparently the rule in South Dakota is that a sua sponte duty is
present where needed to protect the defendant's rights. State v. Magnuson,
46 S.D. 156, 191 N.W. 460, 461 (1922).
42. Pearson v. State, 143 Tenn. 385, 226 S.W. 538, 541 (1920); Rowan v.
State, 212 Tenn. 224, 369 S.W.2d 543, 547-48 (1963).
43. TEx. STAT. art. 36.19 (1966) provides: '"Whenever it appears by the
record in any criminal action upon appeal that any requirement of Articles
36.14 [Charge of Court], 36.15 [Requested Special Charges], 36.16 [Final
Charge], 36.17 [Charge Certified by Judge] and 36.18 [Jury may take
Charge] has been disregarded, the judgment shall not be reversed unless
the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of
defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not
had a fair and impartial trial. All objections to the charge and to the re-
fusal of special charges shall be made at the time of the trial." See, e.g.,
Thayer v. State, 452 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Tex. Crim. 1970); Ashworth v. State,
418 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Crim. 1967); Rogers v. State, 420 S.W.2d 714, 715
(Tex. Crim. 1967).
44. Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: "No
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a
party must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds
for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the ap-
pellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may review
the giving or failure to give an instruction." Also note that Rule 46
makes a formal exception unnecessary. The party need only bring an
error or omission to the attention of the court in order to preserve his
right to review. The special exception "in the interest of justice" provides
the court below with a sua sponte duty to insure that the instructions pro-
vided a just result; even though cases are under the former law. UTAH CODE
A third group of states at least claim that they do not recognize
a sua sponte duty. States in this group include: Alabama,48 Ar-
of 1943, § 104-24-14 now incorporated into Rule 51: State v. Yee Foo
Lun, 45 U. 531, 147 P. 488 (1915); In re Hanson's Will, 50 U. 207, 167 P. 256
(1917); Salt Lake & U.R. Co. v. Schramm, 56 U. 53, 189 P. 90; and under
the current rule: Morgan v. Pistone, 25 U.2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970),
demonstrate situations where no such sua sponte duty was required.
45. It is not entirely clear, however, whether a sua sponte duty actually
operates in Vermont. The Supreme Court held, "[a] court, in its charge
to the jury, has a primary duty to define essential issues of fact and in-
struct on the law applicable to such issues, even without request. State
v. Coburn, 122 Vt. 102, 105, 165 A.2d 349, 352 (1960)." State v. Audette,
264 A.2d 786, 789 (Vt. S. Ct. 1970). But five years earlier the same court
held, "It is the duty of the court to charge fully upon all points of law in the
case whether or not it is requested to do so. [citations]. But where it is
claimed the court has failed to instruct on one or more essential points or
issues, such failure must be brought to the court's attention before the jury
retires so as to afford the court fair opportunity to correct, add to, or
modify the instructions given. This is the well established law of this
state [citations]." State v. Quesnel, 124 Vt. 491, 207 A.2d 155, 157 (1965).
The requirement that the judge be informed by counsel of any omission
before the jury retires, would seem to effectively counter the effect oI
any sua sponte duty of the judge.
46. "It is generally held that it is the duty of the court in a criminal case
to instruct the jury on the general principles applicable to the case . . .
Gardner v. State, 27 Wyo. 316, 330, 196 P. 750 .... But particular instruc-
tions must generally be requested ... Brantley v. State, 9 Wyo. 102, 61 P.
139. . ." State v. Catellier, 63 Wyo. 123, 179 P.2d 203, 222 (1947).
47. FED. R. Cam'. P. 30 reads in part: "At the close of the evidence or
at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any
party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law
as set forth in the requests.. ." (emphasis added). This seems to be as
clear a statement as any that a judge need not give an instruction unless
so requested. But the case law indicates: "In a criminal case the court
must instruct on all essential questions of law involved, whether or not it
is requested to do so. [citations]." Samuel v. United States, 169 F.2d 787,
792 (9th Cir. 1948). Although Rule 30 is more recent (amended Feb. 28,
1966, effective July 1, 1966) than any case using the broad "essential ques-
tions" language quoted above, specific examples of such exceptions can be
found recently. See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599, 602
(6th Cir. 1968) (elements of crime charges must be given whether or not
requested). The means the Rybicki Court used, and other courts will un-
doubtedly use, to ignore the limitation of the trial court's duty under
Rule 30 is the "plain error" rule of FED. R. Cnnm. P. 52(b). That Rule
states: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Thus Rule
30 may have served only to shift the sua sponte duty from "essential ques-
tion" to questions "affecting substantial rights" of the defendant, if such
can be called a shift.
48. A sua sponte duty does not exist in Alabama, in fact no reviewable
error results even if counsel objects or excepts to the court's omission.
A party's only remedy is to submit a written request for the instruction it
desires. Long v. State, 24 Ala. App. 571, 139 So. 113 (1932); Patterson v.
State, 37 Ala. App. 161, 66 So. 2d 191, 193 (1953); Binger v. State, 206 So. 2d
894, 896-97 (Ala. App. 1967).
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kansas,49 Delaware,5" Hawaii, 51 Illinois, 52 Indiana,
5 3 Louisiana, 54
49. ARK. STAT. § 43-2134 (1947) provides: "When the evidence is con-
cluded, the court shall on motion of either party, instruct the jury on the
law applicable to the case." The cases agree that a request from counsel is
required before the omission of an instruction may be complained of.
See Judd v. State, 192 Ark. 1178, 96 S.W.2d 604, 606 (1936); Carlton v.
State, 109 Ark. 516, 161 S.W. 145, 147 (1913).
50. DEL. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 51 (1971) provides in part: "At the close of
the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any
party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law
as set forth in the requests... No party may assign as error the giving
or failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before or at a
time set by the court immediately after the jury retires to consider its
verdict . . . Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the
hearing of the jury." The purpose of enacting this rule was to abolish the
practice of taking general exceptions to the charge and to provide the
court without notice of errors or omissions. Dietz v. Mead, 2 Storey 481,
160 A.2d 372 (1960); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 1 Storey 264, 144 A.2d 123
(1958). This necessarily precludes the existence of a sua sponte duty.
51. The HAwAI REV. STATS. (1968) provide generally for the court to
"instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts of the case..."
(§ 635-17), and further provide for jury to be instructed that they are
exclusive judges of fact (§ 635-17). But the existence of a sua sponte
duty is put in doubt by § 635-41 which provides that "[i]t shall be the
duty of the counsel for the respective parties to a cause to furnish the
court with a written memorandum, of their request for charging of the
jury upon the points of law involved therein, and it shall not be incumbent
upon the court, in cases where the parties are represented by counsel, to
charge the jury upon the law, unless requested in writing. But if either
party is unrepresented by counsel, the court shall charge the jury on his
own behalf, and the court may, of its own motion, charge the jury upon
any point of law involved in the trial."
52. "It has consistently been held in Illinois that if a defendant wishes
certain instructions to be given, he should offer them and request the
court to give them, since the trial court is under no duty to give instruc-
tions on its own motion. (People v. Lindsay, 412 Ill. 472, 484, 107 N.E.2d
614 (1952).)" People v. Marshall, 96 Ill. App. 2d 124, 238 N.E.2d 182, 183
(1968). But despite this rule, the Illinois Courts when hard pressed will
act otherwise. In People v. Birmingham, 301 Ill. 513, 134 N.E. 54 (1922),
for example, the trial court had not instructed as to the presumption of
innocence. The Supreme Court concluded: "It is no part of the court's
duty to prepare instructions for either party to a criminal prosecution...
We will not, however, affirm a judgment of conviction in any such case
where the evidence leaves us in serious doubt of the defendant's guilt."
134 N.E. 54 at 57.
53. IND. STAT. § 9-1805 (1956) provides in part: "In charging the jury
the court must state to them all matters of law which are necessary for
their information in giving their verdict." But the cases conclude that this
language "does not relieve a party from submitting desired instructions, if
the court, through oversight or otherwise, fails to instruct as fully as a
Maryland, 5 Massachusetts,5" Mississippi, 57 Montana,58 North Da-
party desired." Barker v. State, 238 Ind. 271, 150 N.E.2d 680, 683 (1958).
Short v. State, 250 Ind. 459, 14 Ind. Dec. 405, 237 N.E.2d 258, 262 (1968).
54. LA. CODE CRn=. P. art. 802(1) (1966) generally provides that, "[tihe
court shall charge the jury: [as] to the law applicable to the case." But
the Code further provides that certain instructions must be given in certain
or specified situations: role of jury (Art. 802(2) ), evaluation of evi-
dence (Art. 802(3) ), lesser included offenses (Art. 803), insanity (Art.
803), presumption of innocence (Art. 804 A. (1) ), proof beyond a reason-
able doubt (Art. 804 A. (1) ), benefit of doubt for defendant (Art. 804 A.
(2) ), duty of jury if not convinced to find not guilty (Art. 804 B.). With
these legislative guidelines it is not surprising that parties may not com-
plain on appeal of instructions not given, unless those instructions were
requested. State v. Straener, 190 La. 457, 182 So. 571 (1938); State v.
Scossoni, 48 La. Ann. 1464, 21 So. 32 (1896); State v. Scott, 12 La. Ann.
386 (1857).
55. Maryland is unique in that by constitutional mandate (MD. ColsT.
art. XV, § 5) "[i]n the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the
Judges of Law." The trial court, however, is required to give advisory
instructions as to the law. Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275, 17 A. 1044 (1889).
Although no duty has been established, the Maryland Supreme Court
now "recommend[s] that a trial court should give instructions when-
ever requested or whenever the court considers it desirable even
though not requested." (emphasis added) Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370,
183 A.2d 359, 365 (1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 767 (1963). Luery v.
State, 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 (1911). In the same case, however, the
Giles court refused to consider a claim that the jury should have been, but
was not, adequately instructed, solely on the ground that the defendant
had not requested the instruction he now urged was needed. 183 A.2d
359 at 367. No sua sponte duty is likely to exist in Maryland as long as
the scheme of jurors as judges of law retains its vitality.
56. The relevant statutory language recites simply, "[t]he court ...
shall charge the jury." MAss. GEar. LAWS ch. 278, § 11 (1972). The case
law indicates that no sua sponte duty exists. Commonwealth v. Taylor,
319 Mass. 631, 67 N.E.2d 237 (1946); Commonwealth v. Sovrensky, 269
Mass. 460, 169 N.E. 418 (1929); Commonwealth v. Meserve, 154 Mass. 64,
27 N.E. 997 (1891).
57. Although the language of the Mississippi statute is typical of stat-
utes concerning jury instructions ("at the request of either party he shall
instruct the jury upon the principles of law applicable to the case."
Code of 1942, § 1530), Mississippi is the only state which has construed the
language as prohibiting the court from instructing. See Ouille v. Saliba,
246 Miss. 365, 149 So. 2d 468 (1963); Gangloff v. State, 232 Miss. 395,
99 So. 2d 461, 464 (1958); Jones v. State, 216 Miss. 186, 60 So. 2d
217, 217-18 (1953); J.C. Penney Co. v. Evans, 160 So. 779, 781 (Miss.
S. Ct. 1935) (giving same construction to same statute in prior code, Code
of 1930, § 586).
58. REV. CODS MoNT. § 95-1910(e) (1969) provides in part: "When the
instructions have been passed upon and settled by the court, and before
the arguments to the jury have begun, the court shall charge the jury in
writing, giving in such charge only such instructions as have been passed
upon and settled." This language and that of the previous statute on in-
structions, REV. CODE MONT. § 94-7201 (1947) now repealed, is construed to
prevent appellate review of omissions in instructions which were not
pointed out at trial. State v. Stone, 40 Mont. 88, 93, 105 P. 89 (1909);
State v. Watson, 144 Mont. 576, 398 P.2d 949 (1965); State v. Francis,
58 Mont. 659, 670, 194 P. 304 (1920); State v. Peters, 146 Mont. 188, 405
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kota,59 Oregon,60 Virginia,6 Washington,6 2 West Virginia 63 and
P.2d 642, 652 (1965). The remaining language of § 95-1910 (e) ("In charg-
ing the jury, the court shall give them all matters of law which it thinks
necessary for the jury's information in rendering a verdict") has not yet
been held to modify this rule.
59. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-21-33 (1960) provides: "The court may sub-
mit to the counsel in the case for examination the written instructions
which it proposes to give to the jurors, and may require such counsel,
after a reasonable examination thereof, to designate such parts thereof as
he may deem objectionable, and thereupon such counsel must designate
such parts of the instructions as he may deem improper, and thereafter
only the parts so designated shall be deemed excepted to, or subject to
exception." The cases hold that where the court so submits the written
instructions to the counsel for approval, counsel cannot later object to
them unless they properly preserved an exception upon such submission
by the court. State v. Powell, 73 N.W.2d 777 (N.D. 1955); State v. Carroll,
123 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1963); State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d 700 (N.D.
1968).
60. While a court may instruct without a request to do so as provided
by statute he has no obligation to do so. State v. Murray, 238 Or. 567,
395 P.2d 780, 785 (1964). But in Oregon, as in a number of other states,
the courts have not yet been faced with a case where a fundamental
instruction, such as on the presumption of evidence, is omitted. Only after
such a case can the true extent of the absence of a sua sponte duty be
accurately measured.
61. It is the practice in Virginia for the trial court to give only those
instructions requested by counsel. Drinkard v. Commonwealth, 165 Va.
799, 183 S.E. 251, 253 (1936); Poole v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 262, 176
S.E.2d 917, 921 (1970). The litigation in that state is not over the court's
duty, but rather the court's authority. See Drinkard, Poole, supra.
62. "Misdirection may be error, but nondirection in the absence of a
request, is never error. Counsel forthrightly concedes that no instruction
upon this subject was requested. Consequently, the assignment of error
presents nothing for this court to review." State v. Myers, 53 Wash. 2d 446,
334 P.2d 536, 539 (1959); State v. Goldstein, 58 Wash. 2d 155, 361 P.2d 639,
641-42 (1961); State v. Missner, 72 Wash. 2d 1022, 435 P.2d 638, 642 (1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 885 (1968).
63. According to the cases, no duty exists in West Virginia. State
v. Cobbs, 40 W. Va. 718, 22 S.E. 310, 311 (1895); State v. Beatty,
51 W. Va. 232, 41 S.E. 434, 436-37 (1902); State v. Alie, 82 W. Va. 601,
96 S.E. 1011, 1013 (1918). The rule was established, however, because the
instructions given and refused were not made part of the appellate record,
and the trial court was presumed to have properly instructed the jury.
If no exception showed on the appellate record, the appellate court would
not know whether the instruction had in fact been given. Thus the rule
became: if no exception to an instruction showed on the record "it must be
held here, either that the prisoner waived his right to have such an instruc-
tion, or that the court gave the instruction. It is easy to conceive of cir-
cumstances which may have led the prisoner to waive that right, and under
which he would not thereby be prejudiced." State v. Beatty, 41 S.E. at 437.
Soon after these cases were decided, however, all instructions given were
Wisconsin.0 4 Many of these states are likely to shift from this
group to the previous group, however, when they are finally faced
with a "hard case" such as the failure to instruct the jury on the
presumption of innocence or as to the burden of proof. The fact
that many small states with low appellate activity are in this cat-
egory supports this point.
A few of these states, however, have already addressed a "hard
case" and have confirmed the continuing non-existence of a sua
sponte duty. In Mississippi, sua sponte instructions not only are
not required, but are, in fact, prohibited by statute. Unfortunately,
this leaves the judge without the ability to give instructions he
feels are needed, even instructions explaining basic legal princi-
ples.
In the four remaining jurisdictions of Alaska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico6 r and Maine 66 the issue of a sua sponte duty has ap-
parently not been raised.
Although this article proposes the abolition of the sua sponte
required to be part of appellate record. W. VA. C. § 56-6-20 (1966). But at-
the same time was passed W. VA. C. § 56-6-19, which, W.VA. R. CODE
P. 51, has recently been held to require a party to except to an omission
in the instructions. Yeager v. Stevenson, 180 S.E.2d 214, 218 (W. Va. S.
Ct. 1971).
64. Generally there exists no duty in Wisconsin. State v. Yancey,
32 Wis. 2d 104, 112, 145 N.W.2d 145, 149 (1966); Johns v. State, 14
Wis. 2d 119, 109 N.W.2d 490, 495 (1961); State v. Cassel, 48 Wis. 2d 619,
180 N.W.2d 607, 612 (1970). But the case of Price v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 117,
154 N.W.2d 222 (1967), adds an interesting wrinkle. After reaffirming the
absence of a duty, the court holds that in the unusual case in which
there is a great disparity between the skill of counsel, justice may
require that the trial judge offer an instruction for counsel's consideration.
Id. 154 N.W.2d at 228. The rule that counsel must request instructions
which he later complains were omitted, is then left intact. The Price
case involved a "disparity of skill" in favor of the prosecution. It is not
clear whether incompetent prosecutors must be rendered the same service.
65. A rule effective July 1, 1972 provides in part:
(a) The court must instruct the jury upon all questions of law
necessary for guidance in returning a verdict .... (g) Except as
provided in paragraph (a) of this rule, for the preservation of
error in the charge, objection to any instruction given must be
sufficient to alert the mind of the court to the claimed vice
therein, or, in case of failure to instruct on any issue, a correct
written instruction must be tendered before the jury is instructed.
N.M. STATS. ANN. § 41-23-41 (Supp., 1973). This language would seem to
clearly negate any sua sponte duty. But since other statutes appearing
just as clear have been construed otherwise, a better conclusion would be
that it is now too early to determine whether a duty exists in New Mexico.
66. 14 ME. REV. STAT. ANw. § 1105 (Supp. 1973-74) provides in part:
"During a jury trial the presiding justice shall rule and charge the jury,
orally and in writing upon all matters of law arising in the case .... "
But the issue as to whether counsel must request material instructions
omitted to assign error, has not yet been decided.
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duty, it criticizes the Mississippi system as failing to insure that the
jury is adequately informed to correctly perform its function. Ab-
olition of the duty of the trial judge to give instructions in the ab-
sence of request by counsel can only be justified when statutes or
court rules insure that each jury will be instructed on the legal
principles which describe the basic rules of their task. It is pro-
posed here that states having statutes which already require such
basic instructions be given 67 may simply abolish the sua sponte duty.
States having no such statutes should abolish the sua sponte duty
only with enactment of such statutes. Mississippi, it is recom-
mended, should legislate such mandatory instructions if it keeps
its sua sponte prohibition statute.
PoLIcY EVALUATION
As noted above, California is only one of the many states impos-
ing a sua sponte duty on the trial judge. But, perhaps because of
the large amount of appellate activity in the state, the unjustified
difficulties caused by the sua sponte duty are more acute and hence
more visible. The situation in California will be the focus of the
remaining sections of this article, but the conclusions drawn may
be applied to any jurisdiction with a sua sponte duty or any juris-
diction concerned with the problem of adequately instructing the
jury as to the applicable law of the case.
As in other states, the expansion of the duty of a California trial
judge to instruct the jury without request of counsel is a recent
development in the appellate decisions. While at one time it was
assumed that a California trial court had no obligation to instruct
the jury on particular points in the absence of request by coun-
sel,68 the variety of instructions now required to be given sua
sponte is extensive. Judge Julius M. Title of the Los Angeles Su-
perior Court has observed:
[In recent years the appellate courts have established a trend
which places an increasingly onerous burden on the trial judge to
instruct in a variety of areas without any request by counsel. The
list of sua sponte instructions has proliferated to such an astound-
ing degree, that some knowledgeable defense counsel now make it
67. See, e.g., HAwAiI REV. STAT. § 635-17 (1968); LA. STAT. ANN. C.
Ci. P. ARTs. 802-04 (1967); Mo. STAT. Am&. § 546.070(4) (1953); and
CAL. PEx. CODE §§ 1127, 1096 (West 1970).
68. See, e.g., People v. Matthai, 135 Cal. 442, 445, 67 P. 694, 695-96 (1902).
their general practice to request no instruction of any kind from
the Court, knowing that if the prosecutor and judge are not com-
pletely knowledgeable concerning sua sponte requirements, that
there is practically a built-in ground for reversal in almost every
case of any complexity that defense counsel wishes to appeal.6 9
The duty to instruct sua sponte is present in such diverse areas
as: basic elements of the charged offense,70 reasonable doubt, pre-
sumption of innocence and burden of proof,"' circumstantial evi-
dence,7 2 caution as to oral admissions and confessions,73 caution-
ary instruction in sex cases,74 expert testimony,75 specific intent,7 6
flight,77 involvement of accomplice,78 self-defense,79 use of terms
with particular legal or technical meaning,80 lesser included of-
fenses,8 ' defense of diminished capacity,8 2 corraboration of testi-
69. Letter from Judge Julius M. Title to Justice Winslow Christian,
Director, National Center for State Courts, March 9, 1973.
70. People v. Jaso, 4 Cal. App. 3d 767, 770-71, 84 Cal. Rptr. 567, 569-70
(1970).
71. CAL. PM. CoDE §§ 1096-96a (West 1970); CALJIC R.2.90 (3d ed.).
72. People v. Marlborough, 55 Cal. 2d 249, 359 P.2d 30, 10 Cal. Rptr. 632
(1961); CALJIC R.2.01 (3d ed.).
73. People v. Scheer, 272 Cal. App. 2d 165, 171-72, 77 Cal. Rptr. 35, 40
(1969); CALJIC R.2.70 (3d ed.).
74. People v. House, 157 Cal: App. 2d 151, 156, 320 P.2d 542, 546 (1958);
CALJIC R.10.22 (3d ed.).
75. CAL. PEN. COD § 1127b (West 1970); CALJIC R.2.80 (3d ed.).
76. See, e.g., People v. Rocovich, 269 Cal. App. 2d 489, 74 Cal. Rptr. 755
(1969); People v. Foster, 19 Cal. App. 3d 649, 97 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1971);
CALJIC R.3.30 et. seq. (3d ed.).
77. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1127c (West 1970); CALJIC R.2.52 (3d ed.).
78. People v. Cuellar, 262 Cal. App. 2d 766, 770, 68 Cal. Rptr. 846, 848
(1968); People v. Williams, 12 Cal. App. 3d 1200, 91 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1970);
CALJIC R.3.10, 3.18 (3d ed.).
79. CALJIC R.5.10, 5.30 (3d ed.).
80. People v. Fontes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 650, 653, 86 Cal. Rptr. 790, 791-92
(1970).
81. See, People v. Cooper, 268 Cal. App. 2d 34, 36, 73 Cal. Rptr. 608,
611 (1968); People v. Grisby, 275 Cal. App. 2d 767, 774-75, 80 Cal. Rptr. 294,
299 (1969); People v. Wells, 10 Cal. App. 3d 318, 88 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1970);
People v. Hoze, 16 Cal. App. 3d 671, 677, 94 Cal. Rptr. 360, 363 (1971).
82. People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 455 P.2d 153, 160, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217,
224-5 (1969); CALJIC R.3.75 (3d ed.).
The sua sponte duty has undergone an interesting development in the
diminished capacity area. The decision in People v. St. Martin, for example,
states: "I[T]he trial court on its own motion must instruct on the issue of
diminished capacity ... where there is substantial evidence that the de-
fendant is relying upon such a defense." 1 Cal. 3d 524, 531, 463 P.2d 441,
444, 83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 (1970) (emphasis added). This language pro-
vides a significantly different standard for determining the court's duty.
It focuses upon evidence that the defendant relied upon the defense,
rather than evidence of the defense.
Normally the duty is defined as the duty to "... instruct on the
general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence."
General principles of law governing the case are considered to be those
principles "closely and openly connected with the facts before the court,
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mony in abortion cases,8 3 unconsciousness as complete defense,
8 4
effect of provocation in homicide prosecution, 5 effect of reason-
able doubt of jury as to the degree of an offense,88 entrapment
as a defense, 7 joint venture defense to theft prosecution, 8 and
and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case." Id.
The special factor on the extent to which the defendant relied on a
defense appears to be an unsupported aberration of the general rule.
The language concerning defense reliance quoted above from the St.
Martin decision, is supported by the citation of three cases: People
v. Castillo, 70 Cal. 2d 264, 270-71, 449 P.2d 449, 452, 74 Cal. Rptr. 385,
388 (1969), which does not use such a standard of reliance on the defense
by defendant, but rather the traditional standard of evidence supporting
the defense; People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 490-91, 386 P.2d 677, 684,
35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 84 (1963), which uses a reliance standard but cites two
cases, People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-84 (1866) and People v. Jackson,
59 Cal. 2d 375, 380, 379 P.2d 937, 940, 29 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1963), neither
of which mention such a reliance standard; and People v. Corley, 64 Cal.
2d 310, 319, 411 P.2d 911, 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820 (1966) which uses
such a defense reliance standard but cites only Henderson, supra, in sup-
port. It appears, then, that there is no authority for the deviation from the
traditional standard under which the trial judge must give the instruction
sua sponte if the evidence presented suggests that such a defense might
be helpful to the defendant, regardless of whether the defense counsel ac-
tually intended to rely on the defense.
Unfortunately the standard focusing on defense counsel reliance on the
defense is probably preferable. Such a standard would serve to lessen the
harshness of the sua sponte duty now imposed on California judges. It
would require at least some minimal activity by defense counsel to bring
the defense to the court's attention. The desirability of such a softening
of the current sua sponte rule probably accounts to some degree for the
creation and continuation of this unauthorized deviation from the normal
sue sponte rules. But so much authority exists for the stricter sua sponte
duty that nothing short of a clear-cut change in policy by the California
Supreme Court or an act of the California Legislature will limit the sua
sponte duty.
The unauthorized deviation quoted above may well be addressed by the
California Court of Appeal in a case now before it, People v. Gainey, No.
1 Crim. 10953.
83. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1108 (West 1970); People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d
709, 724, 256 P.2d 317, 325; CALJIC R.11.01 (3d ed.).
84. People v. Moore, 5 Cal. App. 3d 486, 492, 85 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198-99
(1970); People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 377-78, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394,
405-06 (1970).
85. People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 531-32, 463 P.2d 390, 393-94,
83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169-70 (1970).
86. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1097 (West 1970); People v. Aiken, 19 Cal. App.
3d 685, 703, 97 Cal. Rptr. 251, 264 (1971).
87. People v. Chavez, 7 Cal. App. 3d 637, 639-40, 86 Cal. Rptr. 788,
789 (1970).
88. People v. Oehler, 7 Cal. App. 3d 685, 688, 86 Cal. Rptr. 703, 704-05
(1970).
comment by court on evidence.8 9 This list is not exhaustive.9 0
It has been argued that the sua sponte duty is necessary to
insure that every jury is properly instructed as to the applicable
law. This argument, however, is not compelling. A properly in-
structed jury is to be desired; the question is by what mechanism
this goal shall be reached. Should the burden of initiative rest on
the judge or on the advocates? What should be the consequence
of failure to instruct with full precision?
Consider an analogous situation: it is clearly desirable to have
the facts established on the basis of the best available evidence
and to have the case determined on the applicable legal theory.
But each of these goals is left to the adversary process which is
the very basis of the Anglo-American system of justice. Why in
the case of jury instructions should this adversary theory be aban-
doned? Are defense attorneys any less competent to propose jury
instructions than to decide which evidence to present or which
legal theory to pursue?
The selective introduction of an inquisitorial role for the trial
judge causes a number of undesirable results. First, placing on
the judge an exclusive burden to compose jury instructions may
reduce the quality of defense representation in that aspect of trial
practice. As noted in California Criminal Law Practice:
Since the decisions clearly and firmly place the burden on the trial
court to fully and fairly instruct the jury on every material issue,
defense counsel tend to disregard the important right the law gives
them to request court instructions on pertinent issues. This is a
serious mistake resulting in the loss of many strategic advantages
available of defense counsel by the thoughtful use of instructions. 91
Second, trial judges may be led into reversible error by defense
lawyers who withhold requests for instructions they know should
be given. The sua sponte duty wastes the competence and the
familiarity with the defendant's interests offered by defense coun-
sel.
Third, a broad sua sponte duty puts competent defense counsel
under the burden of "intermeddling" by the trial judge which may
handicap trial strategy. While it is true that a request of defense
counsel not to include certain instructions may properly be accom-
89. CALJIC R.17.32 (3d ed.).
90. This list was derived from an unpublished notebook, "Trials," 310-314
(1972), prepared for the California College of Trial Judges, by Honorable
Julius M. Title, Honorable Bonnie L. Martin, and Frances M. Davis and
from Appendix A of the same notebook by Honorable Philip H. Richards.
91. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CRIMNAL LAw PRAc-
TIcE § 16.2 (1964).
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modated if he shows that such request has a "deliberate tactical
purpose,"92 the fact remains that the process causes an unnecessary
additional burden for both in performing their duties, and an un-
necessary risk of reversal.
The second and third problems mentioned above were noted by
the court in People v. Chapman:
93
Overbroad appellate demands for sua sponte instructions tend to
hamper the tactical choices of defense attorneys and put trial
judges under pressure to glean legal theories and winnow the ev-
idence for remotely tenable and sophisticated instructions. They
also supply defense counsel an opportunity to capitalize on invited
error by failing to request an instruction thinly supported by
meager evidence, then utilizing its absence as an argument for ap-
pellate reversal 94
THE LEGAL BASES FOR THE SUA SPoi'TE DUTY
The bases of authority for the current California sua sponte
duty are obscure. None of the reported decisions specifically rest
the sua sponte duty on constitutional authority, and only a few
refer to statutory authority; most simply refer to earlier decisions.
The case law trail seems to lead back to the often-cited authority
of 8 CAL. JuR. § 362 which states simply:
It is the duty of a court in criminal cases to give, of its own mo-
tion, instructions on the general principles of law pertinent to such
cases, where they are not proposed or presented in writing by the
parties themselves.9 5
This statement is supported by the citation of two decisions: Peo-
ple v. Peck96 and People v. Olsen.97 Olsen is a case in which the
court gave an instruction of which the defendant on appeal com-
plained. Concerning the duty to instruct, the Supreme Court in
this case said only:
We do not wish to be understood as holding that an entire failure
92. People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 319, 455 P.2d 153, 163, 78 Cal
Rptr. 217, 227 (1969).
93. 261 Cal. App. 2d 149, 67 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1968).
94. Id. at 174, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17.
95. 8 CAL. JuR. Criminal Law § 362 (1922). This rule has now been
modified to include "general principles of law relevant to the issues raised
by the evidence," thus extending the duty to principles concerning every
issue raised in the case.
96. 43 Cal. App. 638, 185 P. 881 (1919).
97. 80 Cal. 122, 22 P. 125 (1889).
to instruct on this subject, in this class of cases, would not be er-
ror.
0 8
This is hardly definitive support for the sua sponte duty.
Peck, the other case relied upon by 8 CAL. JUra. § 362, states, with-
out citation, the principle reported in California Jurisprudence and
goes on to say: "This rule is so well settled that authorities need
not be cited herein in support of the statement thereof." 99 So the
trail ends.
A number of cases rest the sua sponte duty upon apparent leg-
islative intent. For example, in People v. Graham'0 0 the court
stated the "competing considerations of the underlying policies"
as follows:
On the one hand, the attorney should exercise control over his case
and bear the responsibility for tactical decisions reached in the
course of his representation. On the other hand, the legislature
has indicated that instructions which affect the substantial right
of a defendant should be subject to review, even though his coun-
sel, through neglect or mistake, has failed to object to them.' 0 '
[emphasis added]
While the legislature has so indicated for instructions "given, re-
fused or modified",10 2 it is not clear that instructions not given be-
cause not requested were also intended to be subject to such re-
view.
The trial court's affirmative duty to instruct is defined in Penal
Code § 1127:
[I]n charging the jury the court may instruct the jury regarding
the law applicable to the facts of the case, .... The court shall
inform the jury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive
judges of all questions of fact submitted to them and of the credi-
bility of the witnesses. 0 3 [emphasis added]
The statute's use of "may" in the first sentence and "shall" in the
second suggests that except in situations specified by statute the
court has no obligation to give a particular instruction.
Similarly, Penal Code § 1093(6) provides:
The judge may then charge the jury, and must do. so on any
points of law pertinent to the issue, if requested by either party;
... At the beginning of the trial or from time to time during the
trial, and without any request from either party, the trial judge
may give the jury such instructions on the law applicable on the
98. Id. at 128, 22 P. 125 at 127.
99. 43 Cal. App. 638, 649, 185 P. 881, 885 (1919).
100. 71 Cal. 2d 303, 455 P.2d 153, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969).
101. Id. at 319-20, 455 P.2d at 163, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
102. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1259 (West 1970).
103. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1127 (West 1970).
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case as he may deem necessary for their guidance on hearing the
case.104 [emphasis added]
Again, the statute does not appear to indicate a sua sponte duty;
rather its wording seems specifically to refute the existence of
such a duty.
But on this point People v. Bender'0 5 states:
From a literal reading of section 1127 and subdivision 6 of section
1093 of the Penal Code... it may appear that the duty of the trial
judge to give instructions, in the absence of request therefore,
extends only to those instructions which the Penal Code expressly
requires. But we cannot believe that, ... the legislative intent
... was to relieve the court from the duty of charging the jury,
on the court's own motion, on all matters of law necessary for
their information .... 106 [emphasis added]
This analysis suggests two points. First, the current sua sponte
duty evolved through case law which, perhaps because the earlier
decisions were not founded on any real authority, now relies upon
interpretations of legislation. And second, such legislative inter-
pretations are of questionable validity.
No constitutional basis for the sua sponte duty has ever been
offered. It might be argued, however, that the constitutional right
to "trial by jury" requires "trial by a jury properly informed."
As noted above, authority for such an interpretation does not ex-
ist; but further, there is good reason to believe that it could not
exist. First, the discussion in the previous section of this article
makes it clear that the sua sponte duty, at least as it has become
today, is hardly a promoter of an informed jury, but rather is an
incentive for counsel to refrain from assisting in the development
of an informed jury. And second, the proposed interpretation of
the constitutional right to a jury trial is contradicted by other
well-supported interpretations of that constitutional provision.
For example, there is much authority for the view that the sua
sponte duty does not exist in civil cases. In Gargosion v. Burdick's
Television,10 7 for example, the court stated:
There is neither reason nor justification for compelling a trial
judge to act as a sort of advisory or 'backup' counsel, with all the
104. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1093(6) (West 1970).
105. 27 Cal. 2d 164, 163 P.2d 8 (1945).
106. Id. at 176, 163 P.2d at 16.
107. 254 Cal. App. 2d 316, 62 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967).
frustration of the employed attorneys' trial strategy and tactics
which such a holding could encompass. 108
Some cases, however, find error upon a compZete failure to instruct
properly on basic issues.109 But clearly, the sua sponte duty in
civil cases is considerably less demanding than in criminal cases.1 0
This result contradicts the proposed "right to jury trial" argument
above, for although the California Constitution declares that "the
right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain invio-
late. . .",1" no distinction is made between civil and criminal cases.
Other provisions of the Constitution do make such a distinction,
suggesting that the absence of any distinction regarding the right
to trial by jury was deliberate. One must conclude that there is
no Constitutional authority for the sua sponte duty."
2
The ultimate conclusion here is that since no constitutional basis
for the sua sponte duty is, or could be, stated, and since the only
stated authority, which is itself of questionable validity, is based
upon legislative interpretation, the sua sponte duty may clearly
be controlled by legislative revision.
The analysis indicates that a defendant has no constitutional
right to have the trial judge give instructions not requested. It
is suggested that the "right to a jury trial" might most accurately
be construed to require that the defendant be given the oppor-
tunity to request whatever instructions he believes appropriate
and the right to have the trial judge give such requested instruc-
tions as may be necessary for the jury to resolve the issues ac-
cording to law. These rights are clearly not infringed by revision
of the sua sponte duty by the legislature.
REVISIoN OF Tm SUA SPoNTE DUry
With these practical and legal evaluations as background, it is
not surprising to find that the Conference of California Judges has
proposed the following legislative reform:
Except for instructions required by statutes or instructions affect-
ing a defendant's fundamental constitutional rights, it shall not be
108. Id. at 318, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
109. See, e.g., Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, 141 Cal. App. 2d 812,
819-20, 297 P.2d 768, 772-73 (1956).
110. Compare 4 B. WiTmIN, CALIFOmqTA PROCEDURE § 195 (2d ed. 1971)
with B. WITKmn, CALIFORNIA CRVna'AL POCEDUm §§ 471, 472 (1963).
111. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
112. Having reviewed the difficulties surrounding the sua sponte duty,
this section's analysis of the legal foundation for the sua sponte duty is
particularly distressing. The sua sponte duty may present the best exam-
ple of the dangers of judicial legislation.
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error for a court in a criminal case to fail to give an instruction
unless requested by a defendant.1 1 3
This proposal might be implemented by enactment of a new
Penal Code section immediately following section 1093.5, as fol-
lows:
Penal Code Section 1093.6:
It shall not be error for a court in a criminal case to fail to give
an instruction unless requested by a defendant, except:
1. In any criminal trial or proceeding in which the opinion of
any expert witness is received in evidence, the court shall in-
struct the jury pursuant to Penal Code section 1127b;
2. In any criminal trial or proceeding in which evidence of
flight of a defendant is relied upon as tending to show guilt, the
court shall instruct the jury pursuant to Penal Code section
1127c;
3. The court shall inform the jury in all cases that the jurors
are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact submitted to
them and of the credibility of the witnesses, as required by
Penal Code section 1127;
4. The court shall instruct the jury in all cases on the subject
of the presumption of innocence and on the definition of rea-
sonable doubt, according to the Penal Code section 1096a;
5. The court shall instruct the jury in all cases as to which
party bears the burden of proof on each issue and as to what
that burden requires, as required by Evidence Code section 502.114
The five exceptions listed above embody all the instructions
mandated by statute. The new statute proposed here does not
include reference to "a defendant's fundamental constitutional
rights" as mentioned in the proposal of the Conference of Cali-
fornia Judges. The omission is intentional; there are no funda-
mental constitutional rights, not already covered in the five excep-
tions, that would need specific treatment in jury instructions.
The constitutional rights which do come into play in criminal
proceedings (e.g., exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence, freedom from coercion of plea, protection against double
jeopardy) are within the province of the judge rather than the
jury. Further, inclusion of a broad "fundamental constitutional
113. Report of the Judicial Efficiency and Economy Committee, Confer-
ence of California Judges, September 26, 1972.
114. At a meeting May 12, 1973, the Judicial Efficiency and Economy
Committee unanimously recommended enactment of this proposed lan-
guage, as California Penal Code § 1093.6. At a September 10, 1973
meeting of the entire Conference of California Judges, this recommenda-
tion was adopted.
rights" exception could undermine the statute's limitation of the
sua sponte duty.
The fact that no present Penal Code section requires revision to
be consistent with restriction of the sua sponte duty, reveals the
large extent to which the existence of that duty rests upon judicial
interpretation or elaboration of legislative intent. However, to in-
sure absolute clarity of legislative intent it would be appropriate
to amend several provisions of the codes as follows:
Penal Code § 1259:
Upon an appeal taken by the defendant, the appellate court may,
without exception having been taken in the trial court, review
any question of law involved in any ruling, order, instruction, or
thing whatsoever said or done at the trial or prior to or after
judgment, which thing was said or done after objection made in
and considered by the lower court, and which affected the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant. The appellate court may also
review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though
no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substan-
trial rights of the defendant were affected thereby [-]; but the
appellate court shall not review the failure to give instructions not
requested, except where an instruction is required by Penal Code
section 1093.6.
Penal Code § 1368:
6. The court must then charge the jury, stating to them all
matters of law necessary for their information in giving their
verdict [--], which are required by law or have been requested by
counsel.
Penal Code § 1469:
Upon appeal by the people the reviewing court may review any
question of law involved in any ruling affecting the judgment or
order appealed from, without exception having been taken in the
trial court. Upon an appeal by a defendant the court may, without
exception having been taken in the trial court, review any question
of law involved in any ruling, order, instruction, or thing what-
soever said or done at the trial or prior to or after judgment,
which thing was said or done and which affected the substantial
rights of the defendant. The court may also review any instruc-
tion given, refused or modified, even though no objection was
made thereto in the trial court if the substantial rights of the de-
fendant were affected thereby [ -]; but the court shall not review
the failure to give instructions not requested, except where an in-
struction is required by Penal Code section 1093.6. The reviewing
court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or order appealed
from, and may set aside, affirm or modify any or all of the pro-
ceedings subsequent to, or dependant upon, such judgment or or-
der, and may, if proper, order a new trial. If a new trial is or-
dered upon appeal, it must be had in the superior court unless the
appeal is from a municipal court in which case the new trial must
be had in the court from which the appeal is taken.
Penal Code sections which affect jury instructions but require
no revision include sections 1093, 1127 and 1181.115
115. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1093(6) (West 1970):
6. The judge may then charge the jury, and must do so on any
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Such legislative restriction of the sua sponte duty would allevi-
ate the problems discussed earlier yet would continue to provide
points of law pertinent to the issue, if requested by either party;
and he may state the testimony, and may comment on the failure of
the defendant to explain or deny by his testimony any evidence or
facts in the case against him, whether the defendant testifies or not,
and he may make such comment on the evidence and the testi-
mony and credibility of any witness as in his opinion is necessary for
the proper determination of the case and he may declare the law.At the beginning of the trial or from time to time during the trial,
and without any request from either party, the trial judge maygive the jury such instructions on t  law applicable to the case as
he may deem necessary for their guidance on hearing the case.
The trial judge may cause copies of instructions so given to be de-liv red to the jurors at th  time they are given.
The enactment of the proposed 
Penal Code 9 1093.6 should effectively
counter the i terpretation of this section given in People v. Bender, at text
accompanying note 105 supra.
CAL. PEN. CODE 9 1127 (West 1970) :
All instructions given shall be in writing, unless there is a phono-
graphic reporter present and he takes them down, in which case
they may be given orally; provided however, that in all misde-
meanor cases oral instructions may be given pursuant to stipulation
of the prosecuting attorney and counsel for the defendant. In
charging the jury the court may instruct the jury regarding the lawapplicable to the facts of the case, and may make such comment on
the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as inits opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the case and
in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his
failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or factsin the case against him may be commented upon by the court. The
court shall inform the jury in all cases that the jurors are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact submitted to them and of
the credibility of the witnesses. Either party may present to thecourt any written charge on the law, but not with respect to mat-
ters of fact, and request that it be given. If the court thinks it
correct and pertinent, it must be given; if not, it must be refused.
Upon each charge presented and given or refused, the court must
endorse and sign its decision and and statement showing which party
requested it. If part be given and part refused, the court must
distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the charge
was given and what part refused.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181 (West 1970) :
When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made against the
defendant, the court may, upon his application, grant a new trial,
in the following cases only:
5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or
has erred in the decision of any question of law arising during
the course of the trial, and when the district attorney or other
counsel prosecuting the case has been guilty of prejudicial mis-
conduct during the trial thereof before a jury
Other sections which concern jury instructios to a lesser degree and
are anso unlikely to need revision include CAL. PEN. CODE §9 1093.5, 1096a,
1126, 1127b, 1137, 1138, and 1176 (West 1970).
protection of the defendant's constitutional rights and other im-
portant interests. The legislature has already specified, and would
have the opportunity to further specify by statute, any instruc-
tions necessary to be given without a request by counsel. The
trial judge would retain his responsibility to give all instructions
he considered appropriate.
Failure of defense counsel to request necessary instructions can
always be reviewed under the standard of incompetence of counsel
set out in People v. Ibarra.11 6 Reviewing a claim of incompetency
of counsel appears a more appropriate remedy for failure of de-
fense counsel to represent his client adequately in proposing in-
structions, than is the expansion of the sua sponte duty of the trial
judge. The rising level of familiarity with criminal law matters
of the bar in general, the increasing trend toward specialization
and certification, and the current availability of various sources
of continuing education render the sua sponte duty less necessary
than it might once have been, especially in conjunction with the
alternative protective measures noted above.
116. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 465-66, 386 P.2d 487, 490-91, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866-67
(1963).
